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Abstract 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays: the first investigates informed trading in the 
Chinese stock exchanges, and the second examines the persistency of correlation of currency 
future prices.  
For the first essay, using a sample of Chinese firms dual-listed in both the China 
mainland stock exchange and the Hong Kong stock exchange, I investigate the two types of 
informed trading - insider trading and trading derived from better analysis in the A-and H-share 
markets. The results suggest that H-shares have relatively more informed trading based on better 
analysis. In addition, the results from the firm size regression can also be seen as indirect 
evidence that larger firms tend to have trading with better analysis and less insider trading. These 
patterns are also confirmed in the sub-period analysis. However, I find no significant relation 
between informed trading and the relative pricing of A- and H-shares.  
For the second essay I examine the dynamic correlation between currency futures prices, 
focusing on the persistency of correlation of currency prices. Using the Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation model developed by Engle (2002), this study incorporates time-varying correlations 
into the analysis. The sample includes eight currency futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange from 1999 to 2008 and the U.S. dollar index future. The study finds that the Canadian 
dollar has the greater persistency while the Brazilian real has the weakest. No less important, the 
study finds that the time-varying conditional correlation between currency futures and the U.S. 
dollar futures is influenced by two types of liquidity: price impacts (Amihud illiquidity) and the 
logarithm of trading volume. 
Keywords:  informed trading, A- and H-shares, insider trading, currency futures, persistency, 
Amihud illiquidity
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Chapter 1 
Analyzing Informed Trading in Dually-Listed Chinese Stocks 
1. Introduction  
 Informed trading can come from insider information or from better analysis, yet to my 
knowledge there is no study in the literature that empirically separates the two. This study 
attempts to do so by analyzing a large number of Chinese firms dual-listed in both the mainland 
Chinese exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges) and the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. This set of firms presents a natural experiment since, relative to the mainland markets, 
there is no doubt that the Hong Kong market is associated with less insider trading. So, in 
addition to understanding the extent of informed trading in China, China’s unique setting has the 
potential to increase the understanding of two aspects of informed trading – insider trading and 
trading derived from better analysis. An added advantage of this analysis is that because the 
same set of firms is being analyzed, firm characteristics do not need to be controlled. Specifically, 
I investigate the two types of informed trading - insider trading and trading from better analysis 
in the A-and H-share markets, based on the methodology developed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, 
and Wang (2002). The method primarily utilizes the relation between daily volume and first 
order return autocorrelation for individual stocks in order to infer the extent of informed trading. 
Intuitively, informed trading causes prices to change permanently and tends to be positively 
correlated with price changes; on the other hand, uninformed trading has only a temporary effect 
on prices and tends to be negatively associated with price changes. While Llorente, Michaely, 
Saar, and Wang (2002) analyze U.S. stocks, it does not empirically separate the two aspects of 
informed trading. 
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Given the assumptions that the A-shares market has more insider trading and that it has 
not increased over time, my results suggest that H-shares have relatively more informed trading 
based on better analysis. In other word, there is relatively more trading motivated by better 
analysis in the H-shares market. Together with results from a firm size regression, the 
implication is that larger firms tend to have more trading with better analysis and less insider 
trading. While this conclusion seems intuitive, to my knowledge this is the first study that 
explicitly analyzes the relation between firm size and aspects of informed trading. 
I further examine the different aspects of informed trading by dividing the sample period 
into two sub-periods. More specifically, I examine the changes in coefficients of informed 
trading in the two subsequent sample periods. The sub-period results further confirm that H-
shares have relatively more informed trading based on better analysis: since insider trading 
should not have increased, the substantial increase in the coefficients for informed trading of H-
shares represents further evidence that trading based on better analysis dominates in the H-share 
market. This makes sense because the Hong Kong market has a long experience in analyzing 
stocks, but initially investors in Hong Kong might have difficulty evaluating Chinese firms with 
a host of transparency and political issues. The relatively small increase in the coefficients for 
informed trading of A-shares is indirect evidence that stock valuation has not substantially 
improved over time in A-shares. That is, it has implication for the changes in the Chinese 
investment environment. 
One related question arising for cross-listed securities is whether informed trading in both 
the A- and H-share markets impacts the relative pricing of A-and H-shares. If H-shares have 
higher informed trading coefficients, suggesting that there is relative more trading motivated by 
better analysis in the H-shares market, than these better analyses will bring the stock price more 
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in line to its intrinsic value. On the other hand, given the fact that the A-shares market tends to 
have excess speculative trading or insiders trading, the price might deviate more from its 
intrinsic value. Therefore, I expect that informed trading coefficients for H-shares are negatively 
correlated with the average H-share discount, while informed coefficients for A-shares are 
positively correlated with the H-share discount. However, the empirical results indicate no 
significant relation between informed trading on the relative pricing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature 
review, Section 3 provides some background information concerning share structure in China, 
Section 4 describes data and methodology, Section 5 presents empirical results, and Section 6 
gives the conclusion. 
2. Literature Review 
There are relatively few theoretical studies on trading volume, with few exceptions such 
as Wang (1994) and Campbell, Grossman, Wang (1993). Wang (1994) proposes a model of 
competitive stock trading. In this model, investors are heterogeneous in their information and 
private investment opportunities and rationally trade for both informational and non-
informational motives. The author examines the link between the nature of heterogeneity among 
investors and the behavior of trading volume and its relation to price dynamics and finds that 
volume is positively correlated with absolute change in prices and dividends. He further shows 
that informational trading and non-informational trading lead to different dynamic relations 
between trading volume and stock returns. Campbell, Grossman, Wang (1993), on the other hand, 
investigate the relationship between aggregate stock market trading volume and the serial 
correlation of daily stock returns. For both stock indexes and individual large stocks they find the 
first order daily return autocorrelation tends to decline with volume. They explain this finding 
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using a model in which risk-averse market makers accommodate buying or selling pressure from 
liquidity for non-informational traders and reward by changing expected stock returns. The other 
implication for the paper is that a stock price that declines on a high volume day is more likely 
than a stock price that declines on a low volume day to be associated with an increase in the 
expected stock return.  
Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) and Bamber, Baron, and Stober (1999) 
investigate other aspects of trading. Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) investigate the idea 
that extreme trading activity contains information about future evolution of stock prices and find 
that stocks experiencing unusually high (low) trading volume over a week tend to appreciate 
(depreciated). Over the course of the following months, they argue that this high volume return 
premium is consistent with the idea that shocks in the trading activity of a stock affect its 
visibility and in turn the subsequent demand and price for that stock. Bamber, Baron, and Stober 
(1999) in contrast, provide evidence that differential interpretations are an important stimulus for 
speculative trading. They find two conditions under which differential interpretations play a 
significant role in explaining trading: 1) they present empirical evidence supporting Kandel and 
Pearson (1995) arguing that trading coincident with small price changes reflects investor’s 
differential interpretations of information. This evidence is important because it is inconsistent 
with conventional models of trade that assume homogeneous interpretations and 2) they also find 
that differential interpretations explain a significant amount of the trading occurring in a sample 
where trading volume is higher than the firm specific announcement period average. This is 
consistent with informed traders acting on their differential interpretations when there is enough 
liquidity training to help camouflage their own information based trades. 
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Stickel and Verrecchia (1994) test the hypothesis that price changes are more likely to 
reverse following weak volume support than strong volume support. Since price changes reflect 
demand for a stock and therefore higher volume reflects a greater likelihood that demand 
originates from informed rather than uninformed trade. Consequently, as volume increases the 
probability that price change is informationally driven increases as well. There evidence suggests 
that a large price change on days with weak volume support tends to reverse the next day. They 
point out this volume effect is reinforced by, yet independent of, a bid-ask bounce effect. 
However, returns do not reverse following days of strong volume support. In fact, a large price 
increase with strong volume support tends to be followed by another price increase the next day. 
Kandel and Pearson (1995), present evidence on the volume return relationship around earnings 
announcement and argue that it is inconsistent with models that agents have identical 
interpretations of the public announcement. They also provided additional evidence on revisions 
on analyst forecasts which is also inconsistent with identical interpretations.  
Chae (2005) and Lee and Rui (2002) provide further empirical evidence regarding stock 
volume. Chae (2005) investigates trading volume before scheduled and unscheduled corporate 
announcements to explore how traders respond to private information. The author shows that 
cumulative trading volume decreases by more than 15% prior to scheduled announcements. The 
decline in trading volume is largest when information asymmetry is high, while the opposite 
relation holds for volume after the announcement. In contrast, trading volume before 
unscheduled announcements increases dramatically and shows little relation to proxies for 
information asymmetry. The author argues all the results for scheduled announcements are 
consistent with asymmetric information series, where discretionary liquidity traders decrease 
volume when they know there is much adverse selection. However, discretionary liquidity 
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traders do not seem to read information embedded in prices for before unscheduled 
announcements. In addition, market makers act appropriately by increasing price sensitivity 
before all announcements. This implies that market makers extract timing information from their 
order books. Lee and Rui (2002), however, examine the dynamic relations between stock market 
trading volume and returns (and volatility) for both domestic and cross-county markets by using 
the daily data of the three largest stock markets: New York, Tokyo, and London. Their major 
findings are as follows: 1) trading volume does not cause stock market returns on each of three 
stock markets 2) there exist a positive feedback relationship between trading volume and return 
volatility in all three markets 3) regarding the cross-country relationship U.S. financial market 
variables, in particular U.S. trading volume, contains an extensive predictive power for U.K. and 
Japanese market variables and 4) sub-sample analysis shows evidence of stronger spillover 
effects after the 1987 market crash and increased important of trading volume as an information 
variable after the introduction of options in the U.S. and Japan. 
Also, there are several papers that deal with the dynamics of returns and volume. Gagnon 
and Karolyi (2009) investigate the joint dynamics of returns and trading volume of 556 stocks on 
the U.S. market. They use heterogeneous trading models rationalize how trading volume reflects 
trading quality of trader’s information signals an how it helps to disentangle whether returns are 
associated with portfolio rebalancing trades or information motivated trades. Based on these 
models they hypothesize that returns in the home (U.S.) market on high volume days are more 
likely to continue to spill over into the U.S. (home) market for those cross-listed stocks subject to 
the risk of greater informed trading. Their empirical findings provided support for these 
predictions, which confirms the link between information trading volume and international stock 
return co-movements. Halling, Moulton and Panayides (2011) introduce a volume-based 
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measure of multimarket trading to study the extent to which investors actively exploit 
multimarket environments. By analyzing a large set of cross-listed firms, they find higher 
multimarket trading among markets with similar designs and strong enforcement of insider 
trading laws and for firms with higher institutional ownership. These findings are important for 
firms evaluating the benefits of cross-listing and for markets competing for order flow. 
Menkveld (2008) studies British cross-listed stocks and finds evidence of multimarket trading 
even after controlling for the possibility of local traders in each market simultaneously receiving 
the same private signal and trading on it locally. Chen, Firth, and Rui (2001), in contrast, 
examine the dynamic relation between returns, volume, and volatility of stock indexes. Using the 
data from nine national markets spent over two decades they show that a positive correlation 
between trading volume and the absolute value of the stock price change. They also demonstrate 
that for some countries returns causes volume and volume causes returns. Their results indicate 
that trading volume contributes some information to the trading process.  
Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) also examine the dynamic relation between 
return and volume of individual stocks. Using a simple model in which investors trade in order to 
either share risk or speculate on private information, they show that returns generated by risk-
sharing trades tend to reverse themselves while returns generated by speculative trades tend to 
continue onward. They test this theoretical prediction by analyzing the relation between daily 
volume and first-order return autocorrelation for individual stocks listed on the NYSE and 
AMEX. They conclude that the cross-sectional variation in the relation between volume and 
return autocorrelations are related to the extent of informed trading. 
Jayaraman (2008) examines whether earnings that are smoother or more volatile than 
cash flows provide or garble information. Consistent with theories that predict more informed 
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trading when public information is less informative, the author finds that bid-ask spreads and the 
probability of informed trading are higher both when earnings are smoother than cash flows and 
also when earnings are more volatile than cash flows. Additional tests suggest that managers' 
discretionary choices that lead to smoother or more volatile earnings than cash flows garble 
information, on average. Perottiand and Thadden (2003) argue that dominant investors can 
influence the publicly available information about firms by affecting the cost of information 
collection. They suggest that under strategic competition, transparency results in higher 
variability of profits and output. Thus, lenders prefer less transparency since this protects firms in 
a weak competitive position, while equity holders prefer more transparency. Market interaction 
creates strategic complementarity in gathering information on competing firms and thus entry by 
transparent competitors will improve price information. Moreover, as the return to information 
gathering increases with liquidity, increasing global trading may undermine the ability of bank 
control to keep firms opaque. Bardong, Bartram, and Yadav (2009) investigate and test 
hypotheses on how informed trading varies with market-wide factors and the structural and 
trading characteristics of a firm. They find strong evidence of commonality in informed trading, 
and a systematic dependence of informed trading on firm characteristics that is largely consistent 
with intuition and earlier theory and empirical evidence, wherever available. They then 
decompose informed trading into two components: one that reflects information asymmetry with 
respect to skilled information processors with potentially private information on systematic 
factors, who generate a private informational advantage using public data; and another 
unpredictable component that reflects truly private information, potentially of traditional insiders. 
They test the pricing relevance of both these components and find that it is only the predictable 
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component reflecting truly private information that is priced, and is priced more strongly and in a 
manner more robust than total informed trading.  
Lastly, there are several papers than examine information and stocks. Chen, Kim, 
Nofsinger, and Rui (2007) study investment decision making in an emerging market by 
examining single brokerage account data from China. Overall, they find that Chinese investors 
make poor trading decisions. The stocks they purchase tend to underperform those they sell. 
They also find that Chinese investors suffer from three behavioral biases: (i) they tend to sell 
stocks that have appreciated in price, but not those that have depreciated in price (consistent with 
a disposition effect - acknowledging gains but not losses), (ii) they seem overconfident, and (iii) 
they appear to believe that past returns are indicative of future returns (a representativeness bias). 
In comparisons to prior findings, Chinese investors appear more overconfident than U.S. 
investors (i.e., Chinese investors hold fewer stocks, yet trade more often) and seem to suffer 
from a stronger disposition effect. Finally, the authors categorize Chinese investors, based on 
proxy measures of experience, and find that ‘‘experienced’’ investors are not always less prone 
to behavioral biases than are ‘‘inexperienced’’ ones. In contrast, Karolyi and Li (2003) find that 
there is a negative relationship between firm size and information asymmetry and that there is 
also a statistically significant relationship between variations in B-share discount and firm size. 
Sun and Tong (2000) look at the relative volatility of B-share and A-share returns. They argue 
that since both A- and B-stocks represent the same claim to a firm’s assets, any excess A-share 
volatility (comparing to that of B-share) must be due to speculative trading and therefore 
associated with A-share premiums. Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) employ a variance ratio of returns 
to A- and B-shares in order to investigate changes in risk preferences. They do not find a 
statistically significant connection between levels of risk and B-share discounts. 
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3. Background Information 
China began to open its economy in the late 1970’s. After successfully liberalizing farm 
ownership and production China began to shift focus and start building stronger financial 
markets by opening the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.1 Most of 
the original companies listed on the two exchanges were state-owned enterprises. The first shares 
traded on the exchanges were A-shares. A-shares are denominated in Renminbi (RMB) and 
issued to local citizens. By 1992 the two exchanges expanded trading by issuing B-shares, which 
were sold specifically to foreigners and denominated in U.S. dollars.  
 In contrast, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange had been operating for almost a century. 
China knew of Hong Kong’s ability to raise large amount of capital within Asia and soon 
approached the exchange with an offer to have Chinese mainland businesses directly listed on 
the Hong Kong Exchange. The Hong Kong Exchange agreed, and since Hong Kong begins with 
the letter “H” the new shares were denoted as H-shares.  
H-shares are stocks traded on the Hong Kong stock market and denominated in Hong 
Kong dollars. In order to sell H-shares companies must meet certain requirements: (1) the 
company must be incorporated in mainland China; (2) the company must have a market 
capitalization of HK $200 million; (3) the company must have earned, 3 years prior to 
application, a profit of HK $5 billion; this means a profit of HK $2 billion the year before the 
application and a total profit of HK $3 billion the two years prior to that; and (4) during the 3 
year period prior to application management must have remained unchanged.  
                                                          
1Shenzhen was designated by the state as a special economic zone in 1980. Shenzhen was originally a part of the city of 
Guangdong. 
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A-shares generally trade at a premium to H-shares. This might be partially due to the fact 
that the Chinese government restricts mainland Chinese from investing abroad and foreigners, 
located in mainland China, from investing in the H-share market. For mainland Chinese, there 
are three ways for individual investors to invest in H-shares: (1) individual investors can travel to 
Hong Kong to set up an account in Hong Kong to buy H-shares; (2) individual investors can buy 
H-shares through Hong Kong brokerage companies that have offices in China; (3) in selected 
cities, individual investors can purchase H-shares using a special service called “H-share Express” 
provided by the Bank of China. 
Table 1 Panel A shows the difference in stock exchange and investor types for A- and H-  
Share Markets. Table 1 Panel B reports the deceptive statistics for the two markets. In 2011, the  
GDP for China mainland is 6.989 trillion USD vs. for Hong Kong market 242.4 billion USD. For  
the Shanghai Stock Exchange the market capitalization is 2.357 trillion USD vs. Hong Kong 
stock exchange 2.258 trillion USD. As of 2011, there were 1,961companies listed on China’s 
mainland stock exchange vs. 1,496 companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The 
value of shares traded for China mainland is 3,670,156 million USD vs. 1,444,712 million USD 
for Hong Kong. In addition, there are 1,273,276.900 trades happening in China mainland vs. 
168,524,300 trades for Hong Kong. As for the number of shares traded, China mainland is 
2,119,387 million vs. Hong Kong’s 2,953,186 million. The average daily turnover dollar value 
for China mainland is 15,042 million USD while Hong Kong has 5.873 million USD. Further, 
the average value of trades for China mainland is 2,900 USD vs. 8600 USD for the Hong Kong 
market. In sum, relative to size of the economy, Hong Kong has a slightly larger stock market, 
more number of shares traded, lower turnover ratio, larger trade size, and greater trade value - all 
of which are characteristics of a more liquid market. 
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Table 1. A- and H-Share Markets Comparison 
Panel A. Difference between A- and H-Share Markets 
 
A-share H-share 
Stock Exchange Shanghai (SSE)  Shenzhen (SZSE) Hong Kong (HKEx) 
Currency RMB HKD 
Investor Chinese mainland investor 
HK residents, foreigners, 
some Chinese mainland 
investor 
 
 
Panel B. Descriptive A- and H-Share Market 
China mainland 
Shanghai Hong Kong 
GDP US$6.989 trillion US$242.4 Billion 
Market Capitalization US$2.357 trillion US$2.258 trillion 
NO. Companies Listed 1691 (931) 1,496 
Value of share trading 
(Total) ($millions) 3,670,155.70 1,444,711.70 
Number of trades 
(thousands) 1,273,276.90 168,524.30 
Number of shares traded 
(millions) 2,119,387.10 2,953,185.80 
Average daily turnover 
value ($millions) 15,041.60 5,872.80 
Average value of trades 
($thousands) 2.9 8.6 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
The initial sample is constructed using all cross-listed A- and H-shares in both the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period 2003 to 2011. For a firm to be included 
in the sample it must have daily price data, daily trading volume, and shares outstanding data 
available for both the A-and H-share market. The final sample covers 68 firms and spans from 
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January 1st, 2003 to December 31st, 2011. Table 2 reports the sample firms and their respective 
industries for the A- and H-shares markets.  
Table 2. Sample of Companies 
This table provides the basic information for the dual-listed A- and H-shares included in the sample. Column 1 provides the name 
of the company; column 2 provides the respective industry. 
Company Name Industry 
ZTECorporation Communications and Related Equipment Manufacturing 
Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science And Technology Co., Ltd. Special Equipment Manufacturing 
Weichai Power Co., Ltd. Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 
Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Ltd. Paper and Allied Products 
Northeast Electric Development Co., Ltd. Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 
Jingwei Textile Machinery Co., Ltd. Special Equipment Manufacturing 
Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Medicine Manufacturing 
Angang Steel Company Limited Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding 
HisenseKelon Electrical Holdings Company Limited Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 
Xinjiang GoldwindScience&TechnologyCo.,Ltd Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 
Shandong Molong Petroleum Machinery Co. Ltd. Special Equipment Manufacturing 
BYD Co., Ltd Other Manufacturing 
Huaneng Power International Co., Ltd 
Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water Generation and 
Supply 
Anhui Expressway Co., Ltd Support Service for Transportation 
China Minsheng Banking Co., Ltd. Banking 
China Shipping Development Co., Ltd Water Transportation 
Huadian Power International Co., Ltd. 
Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water Generation and 
Supply 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Oil and Gas Extraction 
China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd Air Transportation 
China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd Banking 
China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. Air Transportation 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co., Ltd. Coal Mining and Quarrying 
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Medicine Manufacturing 
Jiangxi Copper Co., Ltd. 
Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting, Rolling, Drawing, and 
Extruding 
Jiangsu Expressway Co., Ltd Support Service for Transportation 
Shenzhen Expressway Co., Ltd Support Service for Transportation 
Anhui Conch Cement Co.,Ltd Non-metallic Mineral Products 
Tsingtao Brewery Co., Ltd. Beverages 
Guangzhou Shipyard International Co., Ltd. Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co., Ltd. Petroleum Processing & Coking 
Nanjing Panda Electronics Co., Ltd. Communications and Related Equipment Manufacturing 
Shenji Group Kunming Machine Tool Co.,Ltd Special Equipment Manufacturing 
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Maanshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding 
Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. Special Equipment Manufacturing 
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co., Ltd. Chemical Fibre Manufacturing 
Tianjin Capital Environmental Protectiongroup Co., Ltd. Public Facilities Services 
Dongfang Electric Corporation Limited Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 
Luoyang Glass Co., Ltd. Non-metallic Mineral Products 
Chongqing Iron & Steel Company Limited Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding 
China Shenhua Energy Company Limited Coal Mining and Quarrying 
Sichuan Expressway Company Limited Support Service for Transportation 
Air China Limited Air Transportation 
China Railway Construction Corporation Limited Civil Engineering Construction 
Agricultural Bank Of China Limited Banking 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company Of China, Ltd. Insurance 
Bank Of Communications Co., Ltd. Banking 
Guangshen Railway Company Limited Railroad Transportation 
China Railway Group Limited. Civil Engineering Construction 
Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China Limited Banking 
Beijing North Star Company Limited Estate Development and Operation 
Aluminum Corporation Of China Limited Nonferrous Metal  Mining 
China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co., Ltd. Insurance 
Shanghai Pharmaceuticals Holding Co.,Ltd. Medicine Manufacturing 
Metallurgical Corporation Of China Ltd. Civil Engineering Construction 
China Life Insurance Company Limited Insurance 
Shanghai Electric Group Company Limited Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 
China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Co., Ltd. Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 
China Oilfield Services Limited Oil and Gas Extraction 
Petrochina Company Limited Oil and Gas Extraction 
China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited Water Transportation 
Dalian Port (Pda) Co., Ltd. Port 
China Coal Energy Company Limited Coal Mining and Quarrying 
Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd. Nonferrous Metal  Mining 
China Cosco Holdings Company Limited Water Transportation 
China Construction Bank Corporation Banking 
Bank Of China Limited Banking 
Datang International Power Generation Co., Ltd. 
Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water Generation and 
Supply 
China Citic Bank Corporation Limited Banking 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the 68 firms in the sample. The average (median) 
total asset is 1,102,470.00 (76,912.96) millions of Renminbi, while the average (median) total 
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liabilities is 991,832.00 (41,644.26) millions of Renminbi. The average (median) total 
shareholder’s equity is 110,634.00 (28,087.92) millions of Renminbi. The average (median) net 
profit for the firms in the sample is 17,834.58 (2,446.03) millions of Renminbi. Also, the average 
(median) total number of shares outstanding is 29,356.67 (6,771.08) millions of shares. In 
addition, the average (median) market capitalization is 39,567.80 (14,316.90) millions of 
Renminbi. The mean of tradable A-share is 15,681.03 millions of shares, almost twice of the 
mean of tradable H-shares (8,745.80 millions of shares). 
I use daily returns and trading volume to analyze the impact of information asymmetry on 
the dynamic volume/return relationship. The use of daily data follows that of previous literature 
(Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), Stickel and Verrecchia (1994), Llorente, Michaely, 
Saar, and Wang (2002)). The return series I use for estimation is the daily return series for both 
A- and H-shares of individual stocks from Yahoo Finance.  
Following Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002), I use daily turnover as a measure 
of trading volume for individual stocks. I define a stock’s daily turnover as the total number of 
shares traded that day divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Since the daily time 
series of turnover is non-stationary, the turnover is measured in logs in order to detrend the 
resulting series. To avoid the problem of zero daily trading volume, small constant (0.00000255) 
is added to the turnover before taking the logs. The value of the constant is chosen to make the 
distribution of daily trading volume closer to a normal distribution.2 The resulting series is then 
detrended by subtracting 200 trading day moving average: 
 
                                                          
2
 Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986); Ajinkya and Jain (1989); and Cready and Ramanan (1991) 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics of the 68 sample firms dual-listed in the A- and H-share market during the period 2003-
2011. Total assets are obtained from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Cashflows are obtained from operating cash flows, 
generated from operating activities, and are measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the firm. Operating revenue is Sales 
minus Cost of Goods Sold (and other expenses), before depreciation and amortization. Debt ratio is measured as the ratio of the 
short-term and long-term debt to the total assets of the firm. Items are in millions of RMBs. Tradable A-share size is the number 
of outstanding A-shares (in millions), while tradable H-share size is number of H-shares (in millions). 
Variable Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std Deviation 
Total Asset 15476900 557.05 1102470 76912.96 3064500 
Long Term Debt 180675 0 27504.46 9042.46 42053.88 
Cash And Cash Equivalents 2762156 56.68 181576.38 7918.48 571080.97 
Total Liabilities 14519000 295.05 991832 41644.26 2879280 
Total Shareholders' Equity 1082570 78.71 110634 28087.92 227508 
Total Liabilities and Shareholder’s Equity 15476900 557.05 1102470 76912.96 3064500 
Market Capitalization 1015780 139.47 39567.8 14316.9 124812 
Total Profit 272311 -6805.55 23079.94 3035.1 54257.25 
Total Operating Revenue 271000 -7807.39 22730.63 2873.73 54100.76 
Net Profit 208445 -8838.83 17834.58 2446.03 41922.51 
Basic Earnings per Share 3.36 -1.02 0.58 0.43 0.71 
Net Cash Flow From Operating Activities 348123 -13480.35 33978.48 1872.31 77217.37 
Total  Number of Shares Outstanding 349083 398.92 29356.67 6771.08 72917.2 
State Shares 268485 0 4421 0 32303.18 
Tradable A Shares 262289 72.62 15681.03 3627.39 43233.64 
Tradable H Shares 214837 100 8745.8 1431.03 29314.8 
 
Table 4 provides summary statistics that describe the return ad volume series used in the 
estimation. The average return for A-shares is 0.03% vs. 0.09% for H-shares. The average size 
for A-shares is 44,196,036,115 RMB vs. 43,108,948,156 RMB. The average turnover for A-
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shares is 0.0204658 vs. 0.0088371 for H-shares. This implies that the trading is more active in 
the A-shares market than in H-share market. The variable of interest, volume, as defined 
previously is -0.1433377 for A-shares vs. -0.0331528 for H-shares. This also captures the much 
more active trading in the A-shares market. Next, I estimate the following relation for each 
individual stock: 
 
 
i,t+1 i i t i i,t t i,t+1Return  = C0  + C1 *Return  + C2 *Volume *Return  + error  
       
 
 
where i,tVolume is the daily detrended log turnover of an individual stock and i,t+1Return is the 
daily return of an individual stock. 
In principle, trading contains both hedging and speculative elements. The observed 
volume-return relation depends on the relative importance of one type of trade to another. 
Therefore, one should see a statistically significant positive C2 coefficient for stocks largely used 
for speculative trade, while stocks used predominantly for hedging should produce a clearly 
negative C2 coefficient. In addition, stocks for which neither speculative nor hedging trades 
dominate should produce a C2 coefficient that is insignificantly different from zero. In other 
words, the relation between C2 and the significance of a speculative trade, relative to a hedging 
trade, is monotonic. 
Next, I examine the relation between the importance of informed trading, which includes 
both trading coming from better analysis and insider trading and firm size  
 
t t tC2  = a + b*ORDCap  + ERROR , 
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where ORDCap is a variable representing the ordinal scale of average firm size (market 
capitalization). I expect the coefficient b to be positive (negative) if C2 captures more of trading 
based on better analysis (insider trading).  
Table 4. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev Minimum Maximum 
A Return 92254 0.0002698710 0.0000000000 0.0296557000 -0.5315488000 0.7361111000 
H Return 92254 0.0008509780 0.0000000000 0.0403189000 -0.6666667000 2.0952381000 
A Size 92254 44196036115 6666425864 152838011020 107020184 2063880000000 
H Size 92254 43108948156 5714685525 127961935142 46497403 2056063000000 
A Turnover 92254 0.0204658000 0.0118731000 0.0281283000 0.0000302930 1.4228630000 
H Turnover 92254 0.0088371000 0.0057767000 0.0116996000 0.0000000000 0.4901600000 
A Log(turnover) 92254 -4.5283590000 -4.4332658000 1.2457820000 -10.3236054000 0.3526728000 
H Log(turnover) 92254 -5.4730336000 -5.1534757000 1.7921738000 -12.8774583000 -0.7130182000 
A Volume 92254 -0.1433377000 -0.1692043000 0.8163219000 -5.1532660000 3.3824509000 
H Volume 92254 -0.0331528000 0.0173589000 1.3874109000 -9.3021912000 11.7304722000 
 
5. Empirical Results 
            In this section, I present the empirical results in testing the dynamic volume-return 
relation, especially in how it relates to the underlying informed trading. I first report the results 
on the C2 coefficient from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression from the return equation, 
performed separately on A- and H-shares in order to analyze whether C2 captures more of 
trading based on better analysis (insider trading). I then separate my sample into 2 periods and 
examine the change in the C2 to further analyze the different components of informed trading - 
whether it captures increased transparency in the financial market or greater liquidity and trading 
from better analysis.  
Table 5 presents the results from the above regression for individual stocks and how the 
regression coefficients change with the market capitalization. For each stock in the sample, I 
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estimate the parameters C0, C1, and C2 of the above equation. In panel A, I present summary 
statistics for the time-series regressions for both A- and H- Share groups. The table shows that 
the mean value of C2 is 0.0883250 for A-shares and 0.1342797 for H-shares. I further perform a 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank test to test whether the difference is statistically significant. The 
result indicates that the difference for C2 is indeed statistically significant across A- and H-
shares. This indicates that H-share market is more affected by informed trading. The 
nonparametric analysis points in the same direction: seven out of 68 of the A-share stocks have 
negative coefficients, compared to 0 out of 68 of the H-share stocks. Both parametric and 
nonparametric results are consistent with the intuition that informed trading has a permanent 
effect on prices (positive correlation between volume and price changes) whereas non-informed 
trading tends to have temporary effect and results in price reversal (negative correlation).This 
indicates both A-and H-shares are associated with informed trading. Both C2 coefficients of A- 
and H-shares are positive and statistically different from zero, indicating the importance of 
speculative trading. More important is that the H-share market appears to be associated with a 
greater degree of informed trading. Arguably the H-share market should have less insider trading 
because the insider regulation for A-shares is looser and because the A-share market is the home 
market -- one would expect more insiders in the home market. To the extent this argument is true 
and that informed trading includes both insider trading and trading coming from better analysis, 
the results here present indirect evidence that, relative to the A-share market, in the H-share 
market substantially more informed trading can be attributed to trading based on better analysis. 
This inference is not a trivial contribution because, to my knowledge, no study evaluates the 
relative importance of insider trading and trading coming from better analysis.  
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         In Table 5 Panel B I regress informed trading of A- and H-shares on firm size. The 
coefficient is -0.00035104 for A-shares and 0.00285 for H-shares. As mentioned earlier, I expect 
the coefficient to be positive (negative) if C2 captures more of trading based on better analysis 
(insider trading). The results represent indirect evidence that insider trading and firm size is 
negatively related.  For H-shares, as argued above, informed trading is more from better analysis, 
and it is reasonable to argue larger firms have better analysis because large firms attract more 
attention, can offer greater compensation for analysts, and have greater liquidity and an investor 
base. 
Next, I divide my sample period into two sub-periods. The first subsample covers the first 
half of the sample period, which spans from January 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007. The second 
subsample covers the second half of my sample periods from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2011. 
Dividing the sample into two sub-periods allows me to examine the change in C2 in the two time 
periods. The transparency in China mainland financial market might have improved over the last 
decade. For example, China initiated a split-share reform in 2005. The reform allows investors 
with non-tradable shares to be able to convert them into tradable shares. This should enhance 
market liquidity and allows controlling shareholders to sell their shares at market prices. Before 
the Split-share Structure Reform, two-thirds of the A-shares outstanding were non-tradable 
shares owned mainly by the Chinese government and its affiliates and legal persons. The non-
tradable shares were transacted on contract base and subject to the approval of regulatory 
authorities. The tradable shares were largely held by institutional and individual investors. The 
purpose of establishing such dual share structure was to enable the state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
to raise capital and the government to retain control. However, the structure fostered serious 
speculations and agency problems. Therefore, the Split-share Structure Reform was carried out 
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in an effort to help the Chinese market to function as a more efficient entity. If this is true and if 
C2 decreases considerably, then C2 might capture more of insider trading since insider trading 
should also have declined with increased transparency. On the contrary if C2 increases, then it 
probably captures more of trading from better analysis, which is also another aspect of informed 
trading. By dividing the sample into 2 subsamples, one can better understand the nature of C2. 
           
 Table 5. The Influence of Volume on the Autocorrelation of Stock Returns 
in A- and H-Share Markets - Full Sample 
  
This table shows the relation between information asymmetry and the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns. 
The average daily market capitalization of a stock over the sample period (AvgCapi) is used as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. For each stock the parameter C2i from the following regression measures the influence of volume on the 
autocorrelation of stock returns: Returni,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Returnt + C2i*Volumei,t*Returnt + errori,t+1 where Volumei,t is the daily 
detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Returni,t is the daily return of an individual stock. In Panel A, I report the mean 
value of each parameter for both A-and H-shares of the information asymmetry proxy (AvgCap), the number of negative 
parameters, and the number of statistically significant (at the 10% level) parameters. In panel B, I provide an analysis using the 
following cross-sectional regression: C2t = a + b*ORDCAPt + ERRORt, where ORDCAP is a variable representing the ordinal 
scale of AvgCap. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
Panel A. Categorical Analysis 
  C0 C1 C2 t-stat(C0) t-stat(C1) t-stat(C2) R-Square 
  #<0 #<0 #<0 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64 (%) 
        
A Share -0.0003853 0.0132361 0.0883250 -0.4635294 0.6816667 2.4434286 5.55 
 
(0.0008041) (0.0631140) (0.1081990) 
    
n=68 46 22 7 8 23 54   
        
H Share 0.0004036 -0.0066256 0.1342797 0.3222059 -0.4166176 3.1685294 5.70 
 
(0.0013601) (0.0390351) (0.0591813) 
    
n=68 26 39 0 8 28 57   
        
Wilcoxon Z 3.6173*** -3.2191*** 1.8122**     
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Panel B. Regression Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable a b R-Square (%) Observations 
      
A Share C2 0.10079*** -0.00035104*** 1.4 68 
  
(0.04606) (0.00113) 
  
      
H Share C2 0.0343 0.00285*** 4.87 68 
  
(0.06243) (0.00153) 
  
 
           Table 6 presents the results from the first half of the sample period. For the first 
subsample there are 43 cross-listed A/H stocks. For each stock in the sample I estimate the 
parameters C0, C1, and C2 similar to the regression used in Table 5. In Table 6 Panel A, I 
present summary statistics for the time series regression for both A- and H-share groups. The 
table shows that the mean value of C2 is 0.0868305 for A-shares and 0.0709947 for H-shares. 
The nonparametric analysis points in the same direction: 9 out of 43 of the A-share stocks have 
negative coefficients, compared to only 5 out of 43 of the H-share stocks. This indicates both A-
and H-Shares are associated with information asymmetry. However, only C2 coefficients of H-
shares are positive and statistically different from zero, indicating the importance of speculative 
trading. In Table 6 Panel B the firm size coefficient is -0.003466173 for A-share and 
0.001823691 for H-Share. This result also suggests that A-shares have more informed trading 
that comes from insider trading, while H-shares have more informed trading based on better 
analysis. 
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Table 6. The Influence of Volume on the Autocorrelation of Stock Returns 
in A- and H-Share Markets (January 2003 – June 2007) 
  
This table shows the relation between information asymmetry and the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns. 
The average daily market capitalization of a stock over the sample period (AvgCapi) is used as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. For each stock the parameter C2i from the following regression measures the influence of volume on the 
autocorrelation of stock returns: Returni,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Returnt + C2i*Volumei,t*Returnt + errori,t+1where Volumei,t is the daily 
detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Returni,t is the daily return of an individual stock. In Panel A, I report the mean 
value of each parameter for both A-and H-shares of the information asymmetry proxy (AvgCap), the number of negative 
parameters and the number of statistically significant (at the 10% level) parameters. In panel B, I provide an analysis using the 
following cross-sectional regression: C2t = a + b*ORDCAPt + ERRORt, where ORDCAP is a variable representing the ordinal 
scale of AvgCap. Standard errors appear in parentheses.  
Panel A. Categorical Analysis 
 
C0 C1 C2 t-stat(C0) t-stat(C1) t-stat(C2) R-Square 
 
#<0 #<0 #<0 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64 (%) 
        
A Share 0.0017431 -0.0525420 0.0868305 0.9660000 -0.3822222 1.4937209 3.80 
 
(0.0018854) (0.0720453) (0.1280795) 
    
n=43 7 25 9 13 11 24 
 
        
H Share 0.0021729 -0.0331833 0.0709947 1.5453488 -0.5962791 2.1639535 7.80 
 
(0.001606) (0.0678428) (0.0963158) 
    
n=43 2 28 5 21 11 28 
 
        
Wilcoxon Z 2.5481** -0.2381 -0.1396     
        
 
Panel B. Regression Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable a b R-Square (%) Observations 
      
A Share C2 0.163086279 -0.003466173* 2.86 43 
  
(0.079758205) (0.003157658) 
  
      
H Share C2 0.030873455 0.001823691* 1.31 43 
  
(0.062515493) (0.002475012) 
  
 
         Next, I analyze the second half of my sample period to see if there are changes in C2 
coefficients. Table 7 presents the results from the second half of my sample period. For the 
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second subsample there are 68 cross-listed A/H stocks. For each stock in the sample I estimate 
the parameters C0, C1, and C2 similar to the regression used in Table 5 and Table 6. In Table 7 
Panel A, I present summary statistics for the time series regression for both A- and H-share 
groups. The table shows that the mean value of C2 is 0.0987509 for A-shares and 0.1428814 for 
H-shares. The nonparametric analysis points in the same direction: 4 out of 68 of the A-share 
stocks have negative coefficients, compared to 0 out of 68 of the H-share stocks. The non-
parametric results shows that for both A-and H-Shares market, the numbers of firms have 
negative coefficients are smaller than the first half of my subsample. Both C2 coefficients of A- 
and H-shares are positive and statistically different from zero. In Table 7 Panel B I again use A- 
and H-share as proxies for information asymmetry and the coefficient is -0.001283962 for A-
share and 0.002976575 for H-Share. This result is again consistent with my expectation that the 
coefficient b to be positive (negative) if C2 captures more of trading based on better analysis 
(insider trading). This implies that A-shares have more informed trading that comes from insider 
trading while H-shares have more of informed trading based on better analysis. 
From the above analysis the C2 coefficients for both A- and H-shares increases in the 
second half of my sample period. As argued earlier, an increase in C2 suggests that C2 captures 
more of trading based on better analysis. The result here is consistent with this argument because 
the analysis and valuation of these firms should have improved over time. Stated differently, the 
result is inconsistent with C2 capturing more than insider trading because insider trading should 
not have increased with the increased transparency in the Chinese firms. The different degrees of 
C2 increase between the A- and H- markets are also noteworthy. In particular, for H-shares, C2 
increased from 0.0709947 to 0.142881. The coefficient for the second half of the subsample 
almost doubles the coefficient in the first half for the H-shares. However, for the A share market, 
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the increase in C2 is much lower. The much less pronounced change in A-share’s C2 is 
consistent with the earlier conclusion that C2 captures more of insider trading in the A-share 
market. As argued above, informed trading derives more from better analysis and also from large 
firms since large firms tend to attract more attention, have greater compensation for analysts, and 
have greater liquidity and investor base.  
 Table 7.The Influence of Volume on the Autocorrelation of Stock Returns 
in A- and H- Share Markets-(July 2007 – December 2011) 
  
This table shows the relation between information asymmetry and the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns. 
The average daily market capitalization of a stock over the sample period (AvgCapi) is used as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. For each stock the parameter C2i from the following regression measures the influence of volume on the 
autocorrelation of stock returns: Returni,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Returnt + C2i*Volumei,t*Returnt + errori,t+1where Volumei,tis the daily 
detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Returni,t is the daily return of an individual stock. In Panel A, I report the mean 
value of each parameter for both A-and H-shares of the information asymmetry proxy (AvgCap), the number of negative 
parameters and the number of statistically significant (at the 10% level) parameters. In panel B, I provide an analysis using the 
following cross-sectional regression: C2t = a + b*ORDCAPt + ERRORt, where ORDCAP is a variable representing the ordinal 
scale of AvgCap. Standard errors appear in parentheses.  
Panel A. Categorical Analysis 
 
C0 C1 C2 t-stat(C0) t-stat(C1) t-stat(C2) R-Square 
 
#<0 #<0 #<0 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64 |#|>1.64 (%) 
        
A Share -0.0007802 0.0251611 0.0987509 -0.8262319 1.0491304 2.3272464 7.20 
 
(0.0011523) (0.0672457) (0.1146480) 
    
n=68 62 15 4 7 26 46 
 
        
H Share -2.198E-05 -0.0088177 0.1428814 -0.1917391 -0.384058 2.7547826 5.60 
 
(0.0015384) (0.0435726) (0.0645906) 
    
n=68 40 43 0 4 21 53 
 
        
Wilcoxon Z -4.1071*** 4.5635*** 1.9769**     
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Panel B. Regression Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable a b R-Square (%) Observations 
      
A Share C2 0.14368954 -0.001283962* 1.8 68 
  
(0.046592368) (0.001157002) 
  
      
H Share C2 0.038701309 0.002976575** 5.17 68 
  
(0.062720092) (0.001557492) 
  
 
         As an additional test to confirm the above findings, I employ the variance ratio test in 
French and Roll (1986). Specifically, they analyze the ratio of the variance during trading period 
(weekday) to the variance of trading during non-trading period (weekend). If uninformed trading 
or noise represents a considerable part of trading, the weekday variance should be greater than 
that of weekend, adjusted for the number of days. In Table 8, I measure weekday and weekend 
volatility for both A- and H-stocks. Weekend variance is measured over 2+ days while weekday 
is daily. Volatility should increase proportionally with time, assuming other factors held constant. 
As the table shows, weekend variance measured over 2+ days is far less than 2+ times of 
weekday variance, suggesting a strong presence of noise trading. The average return weekday 
volatility for H-share is 0.0014922 and 0.000833701 for A-shares, almost double that of A-share 
return volatility, which further indicates that there is more informed trading in H-share markets 
that come from better analysis. The variance ratios for the A-shares and H-shares are 0.8774 and 
0.8138 respectively. The greater the ratio, the greater the noise implied. The result indicates that 
H-share has less noise. This is consistent with the earlier conclusion that the H-share market has 
relatively more trading coming from informed analysis. 
           Given the assumptions that A-share has more insiders trading and that it has not increased 
over time, the results suggests that the H-share market has relatively more informed trading 
based on better analysis. With the assumption lower insider trading and the previous results of  
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the C2 coefficients, the fact that H-shares have higher C2 coefficients suggests that there is 
relative more trading motivated by better analysis in H-shares market. I interpret the results as 
indirect evidence that larger firms tend to have trading with better analysis and less insider 
trading. 
 
           The sub-period results further confirm that H-shares have relatively more informed 
trading based on better analysis because insider trading should not have increased, and therefore 
the substantial C2 increase is further evidence that trading based on better analysis dominates in 
H-shares. This makes sense because Hong Kong shares market has a long experience n analyzing 
stocks. But initially, investors in Hong Kong might have difficulty evaluating Chinese firms with 
low degree of transparency and political factors. The relatively small C2 increase in A-shares is 
also indirect evidence that stock valuation has not substantially improved over time in A-shares. 
That is, it has implication on the changes in the Chinese investment environment. The results 
here also suggest the methodology developed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002), for 
established stocks, captures more of trading based on better analysis. 
             One related question arising for these cross-listed securities is whether informed trading 
in both the A- and H-shares market impacts the relative pricing of A-and H-shares. If H-shares 
have higher C2 coefficients, suggesting that there is relative more trading motivated by better 
analysis in H-shares market, these better analyses will bring the stock price more close to its 
intrinsic value. On the other hand, given the fact that the A-shares market tends to have excess 
speculative trading or insiders trading, the A-share price may deviate more from its intrinsic 
value. Given the assumption that the Hong Kong market has better transparency than the Chinese 
mainland stock market, the H-share price is more close to the stock’s intrinsic value. Therefore, I 
expect that informed trading coefficients for H-shares to be negatively correlated with the 
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average H-share discount, while informed coefficients for A-shares to be positively correlated 
with the H-share discount. To carry out this analysis, I first compute the discounts or premiums 
for H-shares as follow:   
 
Discount_H
i,t
=
Pi,t
H
×RMB HKD 
Pi,t
A -1                     
where Discounti, t  is the discount (premium) for H-shares i if it is negative (positive). Pi,tH  is the 
H-share price from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, HKD RMB  is the exchange rate for Hong 
Kong dollars to one Renminbi, and Pi,tA  is the underlying A-share price from the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. I then average the discount over the entire sample period. 
            
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Average Ratios of Weekdays and Weekends Variances for A- and H-Shares 
 
Return N Mean StdDev Variance Weekday /weekend variance Ratio 
A Share 
    
 
Weekdays 56158 -0.000216525 0.0288739 0.000833701  
     0.8774 
Weekends 36026 0.0010229 0.0308252 0.00095019  
     
 
      
H Share 
    
 
Weekdays 56158 0.000202364 0.0386291 0.0014922  
     0.8138 
Weekends 36026 0.0018462 0.0428209 0.0018336  
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∆ Return N Mean StdDev Variance Weekday /weekend variance Ratio 
A Share 
    
 
Weekdays 56157 0.0000001375 0.0409646000 0.0016781000  
     0.9649 
Weekends 36025 0.0000009546 0.0417038000 0.0017392000  
      
     
 
H Share 
    
 
Weekdays 56157 -0.0000010279 0.0557001000 0.0031025000  
     0.8686 
Weekends 36025 0.0000000521 0.0597648000 0.0035718000  
      
      
 
        Next, I perform correlation and regression analysis to see how C2 coefficients for both A- 
and H-shares are related with the average H-share discount. The negative coefficients indicate 
that the variables in question have the effect of making the H-share discount bigger, i.e., more 
negative. Table 9 Panel A shows that C2 coefficients for A-share are positively correlated with 
the probability of discount, while that C2 coefficient for H-share is negatively correlated with the 
probability of discount. Although both C2 coefficients are correlated with the average discount, 
the correlation is insignificant. This positive/negative correlation is also confirmed in the 
regression analysis. In the regression analysis, I use the average discount as dependent viable 
while that C2 coefficient for A- and H-shares as independent variable:    
 
Average H      C2 coef icients %A&  C2 coef icients %H&  Error    
 
            Table 9 Panel B provides the regression results, and both coefficients are insignificant. 
Therefore, there is no conclusive evidence regarding the relation between informed trading and 
the relative pricing of A- and H-shares. 
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Table 9. H-Share Discount and Informed Trading 
 
Panel A. Correlation Matrix for the Average Discount and Informed Trading 
 Average discount C2 (A-shares) C2(H-shares) 
    
Average discount 1.00000 0.09372 
-0.13133 
 
C2 (A-shares)  1.00000 0.02909 
C2(H-shares)   1.00000 
    
 
 
Panel B. Regression Analysis for the Average Discount and Informed Trading 
 
Average discount Parameter Estimate Standard Error t statistics 
Intercept -0.171975239 0.051303309 -3.35 
C2 (A-shares) 0.181877289 0.224649176 0.81 
C2 (H-shares) -0.17999801 0.161764707 -1.11 
R-Square (%) 2.68   
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this study, I adopt the methodology developed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang 
(2002) to study a sample of Chinese firms dual-listed in both the China mainland stock exchange 
and the Hong Kong stock exchange. In particular, I investigate the two types of informed 
trading--insiders trading and better analysis in A-and H-shares market. With the unique two-
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market system one can better understand the nature of C2. That is, in addition to understanding 
the extent of informed trading in China, this unique setting helps one to understand the nature of 
C2. Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) do not distinguish the two different aspect of 
informed trading – insider trading and trading comes from better analysis. However, the analysis 
in this paper provides new evidence on these two aspects of informed trading.  
My results suggest that H-shares have relatively more informed trading based on better 
analysis. With an assumption of lower insider trading and the result that H-shares have higher C2 
coefficients suggests that there is relative more trading motivated by better analysis in the H-
shares market. Together with the firm size regression, the results can be interpreted as indirect 
evidence that larger firms tend to have trading with better analysis and less insider trading. 
By dividing the sample into two sub-samples, I examine the changes in C2 in the two 
subsequent sample periods. The C2 coefficient for the second half of the subsample almost 
doubles the coefficient in the first half for the H-shares. The sub-period results further confirm 
that H-shares has relatively more informed trading based on better analysis because insider 
trading should not have increased, and therefore the substantial C2 increase is further evidence 
trading based on better analysis dominates in the H-shares market. This makes sense because the 
Hong Kong shares market has a long experience in analyzing stocks. The relatively small C2 
increase in A-shares is also indirect evidence that stock valuation has not substantially improved 
over time in A-shares. That is, it has implication on the changes in the Chinese investment 
environment. Lastly, I also examine whether there is a relationship between informed trading and 
the relative pricing of A- and H-shares, but find no significant relation.   
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Chapter 2 
Dynamic Correlation of Currency Futures Prices and Liquidity 
1. Introduction  
      A currency future is a standardized contract used to exchange, at some future date, one 
type of currency for another at a fixed exchange rate. Investors typically use currency future 
contracts for two distinct purposes: to hedge against foreign exchange risk and speculation and 
arbitrage. In regards to hedging, if an investor were to receive a cashflow denominated in a 
foreign currency, than that investor can lock in the current exchange rate by entering into an 
offsetting currency futures position that expires on the date of the cashflow. However, by 
incurring some amount of risk, investors can also speculate on currency futures and profit from 
the rising or falling of exchange rates.  
As of late 2009 the IMM (International Monetary Market), a division of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, estimated that the average daily notional value for the currency futures 
market was approximately $100 billion. Given the importance of currency futures this study 
investigates the dynamic correlation across currency futures prices to U.S. dollar index futures3, 
with the focus on the persistency of correlation between eight currency futures prices traded on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange: Australian dollar, British pound, Brazilian real, Canadian 
dollar, Euro currency, Japanese yen, Russian ruble, and Swiss franc. Using the Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation (DCC) model developed by Engle (2002), I incorporate time-varying 
correlations into the analysis. This study differentiates from previous studies in that it is the first 
to analyze the persistency of relation between currencies future prices. Lyons (2002) shows 
                                                          
3U.S. dollar index futures are listed on the Financial Instruments Exchange (FINEX). 
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currency movement is heavily influenced by trading. Based on this study, liquidity also should 
be an important factor affecting dynamic correlation--that is, this study motivates the study of the 
relation between liquidity and dynamic correlation of currencies future prices. In regards to 
liquidity, there are numerous studies examining liquidity in the spots market; however, there is 
only a handful studies in regards to the futures market. Moreover, there is no previous study on 
how different aspects of liquidity impact the conditional correlation of currency futures. In this 
study, I analyze both price and trading aspects of liquidity of currency futures and how changing 
liquidity potentially affects time-varying conditional correlation. The data concerning liquidity is 
available daily, hence allowing for a more detailed analysis.  
The sample spans from1999 to 2008. The study finds that the persistency of currency 
futures interactions varies substantially across different currencies. The Canadian dollar has the 
greater persistency while the Brazilian real has the weakest. Further, the time-varying conditional 
correlation between other currency futures and U.S. dollar futures are influenced by liquidity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is the literature review, Section 3 
presents data, Section 4 describes the methodology used in the paper, Section 5 presents the 
empirical results, and Section 6 gives the conclusion. 
2.   Literature Review 
             This paper is most related to Lien and Yang (2006), who investigates the effects of spot-
futures spread on the risk and return structure in currency markets. With the use of a bivariate 
GARCH framework, evidence is found that spreads on the risk and return structure of spot and 
futures markets produce asymmetric effects. The implications of these asymmetric effects are 
examined, with special consideration given to the performance of futures hedging strategies. A 
specific strategy, generated from a model incorporating asymmetric effects, is compared to 
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several alternative models. The in-sample comparison results indicate that the asymmetric effect 
model provides the best hedging strategy for all currency markets examined, except for the 
Canadian dollar. Out-of-sample comparisons suggest that the asymmetric effect model provides 
the best strategy for the Australian dollar, the British pound, the Deutsche mark, and the Swiss 
franc markets, and that the symmetric effect model provides a better strategy (than the 
asymmetric effect model) for the Canadian dollar and Japanese yen. However, this study 
differentiates from Lien and Yang (2006) in that the DCC model is used instead of the bivariate 
GARCH. The DCC model is similar to a bivariate GARCH in spirit, but the DCC places some 
restrictions on how the correlation can change (in essence it is a special case of a bivariate 
GARCH). 
There are also several important studies examining volatility and futures. Harvey and 
Huang (1991) examine the volatility implications of around-the-clock foreign exchange trading 
with transaction data on futures contracts from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the 
London International Financial Futures Exchange; whereas, Han, Kling and Sell (1999) use 
standard deviations and numbers of price changes calculated from tick data for currency futures. 
In Harvey and Huang’s study the authors find higher U.S.-European and U.S.-Japanese 
exchange-rate volatilities during U.S. trading hours and higher European cross-rate volatilities 
during European trading hours. While the disclosure of private information through trading may 
partly explain these volatility patterns, they conclude that the increased volatility is more likely 
driven by macroeconomic news announcements. An analysis of inter- and intraday data also 
reveals that volatility increases at times that coincide with the release of U.S. macroeconomic 
news. In contrast, Han, Kling and Sell (1999) find strong day-of-the-week effects for the 
Deutsche mark and Japanese yen, mild day-of-the-week effects for the British pound, and no 
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effects for the Canadian dollar after controlling for scheduled macroeconomic announcements 
and days to contract expiration. The day-of-the-week effects are found to be caused either by 
Mondays’ low volatility, or by Thursdays’ or Fridays’ high volatility. This result suggests that 
the day-of-the-week effects in the currency futures market is not driven by the announcements of 
macroeconomic indicators as proposed in previous studies, but rather by other factors, such as 
private information-based trading or by market microstructure. The study also finds that the 
announcements are processed equally across the days of the week for all four currency futures. 
In addition, Kho (1996) and Fung and Patterson also examine currencies from a volatility 
perspective. Kho (1996) re-examines the efficiency of foreign currency futures markets by 
evaluating the role of time-varying risk premia and volatility in explaining technical trading rule 
profits. The results show that large parts of the technical rule profits can be explained by time-
varying risk premia estimated from a general model for the conditional CAPM. The bootstrap 
distributions for the profits under the null model average one-third to one-half of the actual 
profits and enclose the actual profits well within the 90% confidence intervals. Time-varying 
conditional volatility explains an additional 10% of the profits. In contrast, Fung and Patterson 
(1999) examine the dynamic interactions among return volatilities, volume, and market depth for 
five currency futures markets. They use vector autoregressive analysis (VAR) to identify not 
only the nature of these relations but also the direction and speed of the information flow 
between variables. They find that return volatility is subject to strong reversal effects from 
trading volume and market depth. The results also indicate that the volatility appears to have 
predictive power on volume, but not market depth. Furthermore, this study finds that volume and 
depth are not endogenously determined, as their lead–lag relationship is asymmetrical. In 
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addition, they observe an increasing trend of integration between offshore and domestic 
information that affects the movement of currency futures prices. 
More recent studies include Levich (2012), Röthig (2004), and Lien and Yang (2006). 
Levich (2012) studies both counterparty risk for financial institutions and currency futures. He 
finds that for the period 2005-2011 the market share for currency futures trading actually grew 
relative to the pre-crisis period of the 2007 Financial Crisis. He hypothesizes that this shift could 
be the result of one of several factors; namely, perceived increase in counterparty risk among 
banks, changes in relative trading costs, or changes in institutional factors. The framework 
Levich utilizes, which is mostly graphical analysis, is very different from Lien and Yang (2006) 
and Röthig (2004), who both utilize GARCH-type models. 
Röthig (2004) examines the impact of currency futures trading on underlying exchange 
rates. Using a VAR-GARCH approach he examines the relationship between currency futures 
trading activity (as measured by number of contracts) and total amount of spot market turbulence 
for the exchange rates from 5 countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, and Switzerland) in 
terms of U.S. dollar. The author finds that there is a positive relationship between currency 
futures trading activity and spot volatility and, moreover, that futures trading activity adds 
significantly to spot volatility.  
McCurdy and Morgan wrote several papers together concerning currency futures: 
McCurdy and Morgan (1987) and McCurdy and Morgan (1992). In their 1987 paper the authors 
test the martingale hypothesis for daily and weekly rates of change of futures prices for five 
currencies. Using daily data, they find some evidence against the null hypothesis for each 
currency. Although institutionally imposed limits on daily price changes were found to be 
41 
 
frequently binding (often in the earlier years of the sample), the results are not substantially 
different when data affected by limit moves are removed. Trading day effects in foreign currency 
futures and spot prices introduce complicated day-of-the-week patterns in futures price. The 
study concludes with the retesting of the martingale hypothesis using weekly data. They reject 
the null hypothesis for only one currency. One interpretation regarding the evidence for this 
rejected currency is that a time-varying risk premium exists. This was followed by McCurdy 
and Morgan (1992), in which weekly data for foreign currency futures prices is examined for 
evidence of a risk premium. Covariance risks are measured with respect to the excess returns of 
benchmark portfolios for consumption and wealth. When the parameters representing the prices 
of the covariance risks are held constant, no risk premiums are detected. However, when these 
prices are allowed to vary with the conditional expected returns and the variances of the 
benchmark portfolios, possibly reflecting changing investment opportunities, strong evidence of 
risk premiums is obtained. 
In the mid to late 1990s several studies examined currency futures from either option-like 
or statistical perspectives. In Bates (1996), Deutsche mark and yen futures options are examined 
for deviations from the lognormal assumption underlying standard option pricing models. Two 
methods are used: a theoretical skewness premium and daily estimates of moments using a 
model developed for pricing American foreign currency futures options under systematic 
exchange rate jump risk. Substantial variation over time is found in all moments, along with 
implicit skewness and kurtosis. These implicit abnormalities help predict future abnormalities for 
log-differenced U.S. dollar-Deutsche mark futures prices, but not U.S. dollar-Japanese Yen 
futures prices. Pan, Chan and Fok (1997), on the other hand, examines the random walk process 
for four currency futures prices for the period 1977–1987 by using a variance ratio test. The 
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random walk hypothesis is tested through asymptotic standardized statistics as well as by 
computing the significance level, based on a bootstrap method. Both long time-series prices and 
individual contract prices for four currency futures (i.e. the British pound, the German mark, the 
Japanese yen, and the Swiss franc) are analyzed. The results provide little evidence against the 
random walk null hypothesis, though non-randomness is documented in the Japanese yen. 
Additionally, the currency futures markets apparently become more efficient as markets mature 
over time. 
Bhar and Malliaris (1998) propose and test several hypotheses concerning time series 
properties of trading volume, price, short and long-term relationships between price and volume, 
and the determinants of trading volume in foreign currency futures. Contracts for the British 
pound, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, German mark, and Swiss franc are analyzed in three 
frequencies: daily, weekly and monthly. They find supportive evidence for all five currencies 
that the price volatility is a determinant of the trading volume changes. Furthermore, the 
volatility of the price process is a determinant of the unexpected component of the changes in 
trading volume. They also find that there is a significant relationship between the volatility of 
price and the volatility of trading volume changes for three of the five currencies in the daily 
frequency and for one currency in the monthly frequency. 
  As for liquidity, it has been widely studied with stock markets. Amihud (2002) shows 
that over time, expected market illiquidity positively affects ex-ante stock excess return, 
suggesting that expected stock excess return partly represents an illiquidity premium. This 
complements the cross-sectional positive return–illiquidity relationship. In addition, stock returns 
are negatively related over time to contemporaneous unexpected illiquidity. The illiquidity 
measure here is the average across stocks of the daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar 
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volume, which is easily obtained from daily stock data for long time series in most stock markets. 
Illiquidity affects more strongly small firm stocks, thus explaining time series variations in their 
premiums over time. Further, liquidity is also studied in dual-listed markets. Chan et al (2008) 
study the liquidity effect in asset pricing by studying the liquidity- premium relationship of an 
American Depositary Receipt (ADR) and its underlying share. Using the Amihud (2002) 
measure, the turnover ratio and trading infrequency as proxies for liquidity, they show that a 
higher ADR premium is associated with higher ADR liquidity and lower home share liquidity, in 
terms of changes in these variables. They find that the liquidity effects remain strong and they 
control for firm size and a number of country characteristics, such as the expected change in the 
foreign exchange rate, the stock market performance, as well as several variables measuring the 
openness and transparency of the home market. Goss (2006) studies liquidity, volume and 
volatility in U.S. electricity futures. However, liquidity in futures is expected to behave 
differently to that of spot markets because of the unique asymmetries in futures markets. 
Liquidity in electricity markets is of interest in countries where markets are being deregulated. 
This study estimates these relationships for the Palo Verde electricity futures contract. The 
results show positive relations between all three pairs of key variables. 
3.   Data  
The initial futures data consists of daily future prices for currency futures over the period 
January 1999 to June 2008. This data is collected from RC Research (www.Price-Data.com) and 
includes open, high, low, and close prices; as well as, volume and open interest. All daily future 
prices are in U.S. dollars. The currency futures included in this study are listed as follows: 
Australian dollar, British pound, Brazilian real, Canadian dollar, Euro currency, Japanese yen, 
Russian ruble, and Swiss franc. All eight currency futures are traded on the Chicago Mercantile 
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Exchange (CME) and all currencies prices are coded the same way—the US$ price of per unit of 
currency. Table 1 provides a summary of the contract size, approximate margin, and minimal 
fluctuation of the 8 currency futures. The weighted U.S. dollar futures are used as a basis for 
comparison. The U.S. dollar index (USDX)4 is an index (or measure) of the value of the United 
States dollar relative to a basket of foreign currencies. The USDX futures contract has two 
features that influence its pricing and its use. First, the USDX index is a geometric average, 
rather than an arithmetic average,5 of the constituent currencies. Second, the foreign exchange 
(FX) rates in the USDX index (in U.S. dollars per foreign exchange rate) are in the denominator 
of the index, implying that a dollar appreciation leads to a higher index level. Both the geometric 
averaging and the use of quoting convention have implication for the use of the USDX futures 
contract in hedging a foreign exchange exposure. Eytan, Harpaz, and Krull (1988) point out, the 
divergence between the geometric and arithmetic averages depend on both the volatilities of the 
individual currencies and their co-movements (sometimes referred to as their “correlations”). 
      Table 1. Sample Periods for Currency Futures Traded in U.S. 
Symbol Futures Contract Sample Period Contract Size Approximate Margin Minimum Fluctuation Observation 
AD Australian Dollar 01/13/1987-06/02/2008 A$100,000 $1,688.00 0.01 c/A$ = $10 5378 
BP British Pound 02/13/1975-06/02/2008 62,500 pound $1,890.00 0.01 c/pound = $6.25 8384 
BR Brazilian Real 11/08/1995-06/02/2008 BR100,000 $3,500.00 0.005 c/BR = $5 3122 
CD Canadian Dollar 1/17/1977-06/02/2008 C$100,000 $1,215.00 0.01 c/C$ = $10 7898 
EC Euro Currency 01/04/1999-06/02/2008 EUR $125,000 $2,700.00 0.01 c/EUR = $12.50 2355 
JY Japanese Yen 08/02/1976-06/02/2008 Yen 12,500,000 $2,430.00 0.0001 c/JY = $12.50 8014 
RU Russian Ruble 2/4/1993-06/02/2008 MRR 2,500,000 $3,000.00 0.001 c/RR = $25 3858 
SF Swiss Franc 02/13/1975-06/02/2008 SF 125,000 $1,958.00 0.01 c/SF = $12.50 8383 
                                                          
4
 The short-coming of using the U.S. Currency Futures Index is that it is an unequally weighted index - so, the 
currency that is weighted more heavily, such as Euro, will inherently move more closely with the index. 
5
 This difference between arithmetic and geometric averaging is the source of the divergence between the index (and 
therefore futures contract) performance and the portfolio performance. (The portfolio is constructed as an investor is 
long $1 million in the six constituent currencies of the USDX index, in the proper weights (57.6% in euro, 13.5% in 
yen, etc.).The larger the divergence of performance of the different currencies, the larger the divergence between the 
geometric average and the arithmetic average.  
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         The USDX futures contract began trading on November 20, 1985 on the Financial 
Instruments Exchange, a division of the New York Cotton Exchange, which is now part of the 
New York Board of Trade (NYBOT). The USDX index was originally a geometrically weighted 
average of ten different currencies, with each currency representing a country that was a major 
trading partner with the United States. With the introduction of the Euro, the USDX index 
became a geometrically weighted average of six currencies, which represent five major U.S. 
trading partners and the Euro. Appendix 2 describes the current contract specifications for the 
USDX futures contract. 
 
 
Index Formula 
  The formula for the index level on date t is the product of the six currencies spot rates, 
each raised a power related to a currency-specific weight. The general formula for the index can 
be written as 
 
()*+  , -.*/,+123
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where USDXt  is the calculated level of the USDX index on date t, FXi,t is the foreign exchange 
rate (U.S. dollars per foreign currency unit) for currency i on date t, wi is the weight associated 
with currency i (the weights are determined by the contract specs and sum to one, i.e.,∑ 8/ 4/56
1). N is the number of currencies in the index for the USDX index, (N is currently six and was 
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formerly ten); and K is a constant. Under the current USDX futures contract specs, the USDX 
index is equal to 
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In other words, it is a weighted geometric mean of the following: 
Euro (EUR), 57.6% weight 
Japanese yen (JPY) 13.6% weight 
Pound sterling (GBP), 11.9% weight 
Canadian dollar (CAD), 9.1% weight 
Swedish krona (SEK), 4.2% weight and 
Swiss franc (CHF) 3.6% weight  
I first begin by checking for stationarity of the price series data and find that the price 
series are non-stationary (the null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected), while their first 
differences are stationary. This implies that the use of a return series is appropriate, with the 
return being computed as the log of the current price over the previous price. Table 2 provides 
the summary statistics of the daily currency futures returns. The distribution of the daily futures 
returns is not normal, according to the Jarque-Bera test, and characterized by high kurtosis; 
especially, for the Brazilian real and Russian ruble. In addition, the Australian dollar, British 
pound, Brazilian real, Canadian dollar, and Euro currency futures returns are all negatively 
skewed. In contrast, the Japanese yen, Russian ruble, and Swiss franc are all positively skewed. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics on Daily Currency Futures Returns 
  Australian Dollar British Pound Brazilian Real Canadian Dollar Euro Currency Japanese Yen Russian Ruble Swiss Franc 
 Mean 3.18E-05 -8.46E-06 -7.34E-05 1.13E-06 4.97E-05 5.62E-05 9.07E-05 4.43E-05 
 Median 0.000157581 0 0 0 6.87E-05 0 0.000430829 0 
 Maximum 0.022452484 0.019772928 0.277946112 0.009300023 0.011453081 0.035933091 0.154327806 0.021572106 
 Minimum -0.019667895 -0.022873448 -0.320463148 -0.011405534 -0.011562519 -0.018272159 -0.155461735 -0.033270935 
Variance 8.80676E-06 9.22146E-06 0.000323549 2.47396E-06 7.10789E-06 9.74863E-06 0.000455771 1.14048E-05 
 Std. Dev. 0.002967618 0.003036686 0.017987459 0.001572883 0.002666062 0.00312228 0.021348784 0.003377095 
 Skewness -0.383453315 -0.077403656 -1.328845259 -0.098795122 -0.030307375 0.564362196 0.015603163 0.093215516 
 Kurtosis 5.886010598 7.149241707 172.7144473 6.350768181 3.829401019 8.376932798 34.1886891 5.910303671 
Jarque-Bera 1997.825011 6021.848429 3746507.82 3707.210228 67.83249116 10078.1588 156326.6691 2970.239927 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 1.89E-15 0 0 0 
 
 
Regarding liquidity, I measure liquidity in terms of the price impact of trading and trading activity/ trading volume. For this 
paper I adopt two liquidity measures, since previous literature suggests that liquidity cannot be measured by one metric alone (Sadka 
et al (2008)). The price impact of trading is computed using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, which is the absolute percentage 
price change divided by trading volume. This impact is computed daily and averaged over the sample period. The larger the number 
the greater is the impact of trading on prices, indicating a more illiquid currency future. Amihud illiquidity measures the price impact 
aspect of liquidity and quantifies the price/return response to a given size of trade. Liquidity, also has another aspect – trading. To 
address this aspect, I use the logarithm of trading volume as an alternative liquidity measure and perform a similar analysis. Table 3 
shows the Amihud illiquidity measure, trading volume, and logarithm of trading volume for the eight currency futures included in this 
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study. From this table one can see that the Brazilian real is the most illiquid currency future 
contracts among the eight; also, that the Russian ruble6 is much less liquid than other currency 
futures. Not surprisingly, the euro currency has the lowest number for the Amihud illiquidity 
measure. Most likely this is due to the fact that the euro is considered to be the most popularly 
traded currency futures contract. The Japanese yen also has a very low Amihud illiquidity 
measure number. This also makes sense since the Japanese yen is frequently used as a carry trade 
currency, due to the country’s near zero interest rates. Finally, the trading volume data also tells 
the same story of the eight currency futures. That is, the Brazilian real is the least traded currency 
futures and the Euro currency and Japanese yen are the most common and popularly traded 
futures. 
 
 
Table 3.  Summary Statistics of Liquidity Measures 
Liquidity Measures Mean Median StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Amihud Illiquidity Australian Dollar 0.000011 0.000002 0.000144 0.000000 0.005876 
Amihud Illiquidity British Pound 0.000004 0.000001 0.000063 0.000000 0.002723 
Amihud Illiquidity Brazilian Real 0.001849 0.000057 0.022539 0.000000 0.657169 
Amihud Illiquidity Canadian Dollar 0.000003 0.000000 0.000031 0.000000 0.001110 
Amihud Illiquidity Euro Currency 0.000002 0.000000 0.000024 0.000000 0.000998 
Amihud Illiquidity Japanese Yen 0.000002 0.000000 0.000023 0.000000 0.000706 
Amihud Illiquidity Russian Ruble 0.000005 0.000003 0.000008 0.000000 0.000131 
Amihud Illiquidity Swiss Franc 0.000005 0.000001 0.000046 0.000000 0.001120 
Volume Australian Dollar 3704.010000 2365.000000 4751.650000 0.000000 90210.000000 
Volume British Pound 6289.750000 4316.000000 7280.260000 3.000000 116014.000000 
Volume Brazilian Real 905.167022 1.000000 13039.380000 0.000000 343354.000000 
Volume Canadian Dollar 7902.440000 6214.000000 6909.860000 0.000000 82970.000000 
Volume Euro Currency 13468.880000 10391.000000 17259.540000 6.000000 351187.000000 
Volume Japanese Yen 12856.850000 8563.000000 14709.740000 7.000000 226166.000000 
Volume Russian Ruble 5018.870000 2796.000000 5225.780000 0.000000 47247.000000 
Volume Swiss Franc 8168.680000 6105.000000 7665.540000 0.000000 98763.000000 
                                                          
6
 It should be noted that the Russian ruble had currency controls levied by the government until 2006. 
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Log(Volume)Australian Dollar 7.792657 7.769801 0.982771 0.000000 11.409896 
Log(Volume) British Pound 8.348629 8.372165 0.996711 1.098612 11.661466 
Log(Volume) Brazilian Real 4.356071 4.537947 2.061767 0.000000 12.746517 
Log(Volume) Canadian Dollar 8.657030 8.734721 0.920326 1.945910 11.326234 
Log(Volume) Euro Currency 9.139480 9.248647 0.941483 1.791760 12.769074 
Log(Volume) Japanese Yen 9.010977 9.055673 1.057654 1.945910 12.329025 
Log(Volume) Russian Ruble 8.007806 7.937018 1.066479 2.708050 10.763144 
Log(Volume) Swiss Franc 8.582162 8.717355 1.098639 1.386294 11.500478 
 
4. Methodology 
  For my analysis I chose to use both a GARCH (1,1) model (with a constant term in the 
mean equation) and a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) Model. The GARCH (1,1) model 
can be defined as follows:  
( )1
2
1 1
, ~ 0,t t t t t
t t t
y I N h
h h
µ ε ε
ω αε β
−
− −
= +
= + +
 
The DCC model is merely an extension of the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) Model 
(Engle (2002)). The main difference between the DCC model and the CCC model is that the 
DCC model allows the correlation matrix to change over time. The DCC model is therefore 
unique in that it retains the parsimony of a univariate GARCH model while incorporating a 
GARCH-like, time varying correlation. Accordingly, the DCC can be written as:  
 
1/ 2 1/ 2
,
{ } { } ,
DCC
t t t t
t t t t
H D R D
R diag Q Q diag Q− −
=
=
 
1 1 1( ' ) ' ,t t t tQ S u A B A Z Z B Q− − −= − − + +o o o
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where Q+RSSis the covariance matrix for a vector of k asset returns, R is the possibly time-varying 
correlation matrix, and + is the T @ T diagonal matrix of time-varying standard deviations from 
a univariate GARCH model with UN/,+ on the +V diagonal. W+  XY/Z,+[ denotes the conditional 
covariance matrix of the standardized residuals. In addition, A and B are parameter matrices and 
o denotes the Hadamard matrix product operator, i.e. element-wise multiplication. The symbol  
denotes a vector of ones and S denotes the unconditional covariance matrix of the standardized 
residuals. \+  X]/,+[ is the standardized, but correlated, residual vector. Its conditional 
correlation matrix is given by the variable Rt. For the +Velement of Rt, the conditional correlation 
matrix is given by Y/Z,+/UY//,+YZZ,+ . 
 
 
A simple DCC in a bivariate case would be 
 
2
11, 12, 11, 1 12, 112, 1, 1 1, 1 2, 1
2
12, 22, 12, 1 22, 11, 1 2, 1 2, 112,
1(1 )
1
t t t tt t t t
t t t tt t tt
qq q q qz z z
a b a b
q q q qz z zq
− −− − −
− −− − −
      
= − − + +      
      
 
 
where a and b stand for the DCC parameters alpha and beta. In most cases, a and b can substitute 
for more complicated matrices (e.g. A and B). Lastly, q6P`` ``  is the unconditional covariance of the 
two standardized residuals.  
The DCC model is constructed to permit a two-stage estimation of the conditional 
covariance matrix Q+. During the first step, a univariate volatility model is fitted for each of the 
assets and the estimates of N/,+ are obtained. In the second step, the asset returns are transformed 
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by their estimated standard deviations and used to estimate the parameters of the conditional 
correlation.7 
 
The log-likelihood function for the DCC model can be written as follows: 
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One can perform the estimation by means of a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) to 
yield consistent parameter estimates. The log-likelihood function, which can be express as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 2, ,Vol CorrL L Lθ θ θ θ θ= +
 
 
can be divided into two parts.  
The volatility part:  
( ) ( )2 21 1 log(2 ) log '2Vol t t t ttL k D r D rθ π
−= − + +∑
 
 
And the correlation component:  
( ) ( )11 2 1, log ' '2Corr t t t t t tt
L R Z R Z Z Zθ θ −= − + −∑
 
                                                          
7
 The software used to estimation the DCC model is EViews. 
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5. Empirical Results 
 
A. Estimation of DCC Model 
      The estimate results for the DCC model are given in Table 4.The DCC beta parameter for 
the Brazilian real is -0.9079 and the Russian ruble is -0.5178. Both the real and rubble have a 
tendency to be near zero and often change signs—this may contribute to the negative betas for 
the two currencies. The rest of the eight currencies have a positive DCC beta parameter. The 
DCC beta parameter measures persistency of correlation and therefore better captures relative 
stability. For example, the DCC beta parameter for the Euro is only 0.6073. Recall that the Euro 
carries a 57.6% weight in the U.S. dollar index, which implies that a big currency like the Euro 
naturally is more closely related to the index. Therefore, the fact that the Euro comes out with a 
low persistency is even more clear evidence that its stability is low. On the other hand, the 
weight for the Japanese yen, British pound, and Canadian dollar are 13.6%, 11.9%, and 9.1% 
respectively; but the corresponding persistency of the correlation (the DCC beta parameter) is 
0.9715, 0.9581, and 0.9837. This implies that the stability of the Japanese yen, British pound, 
and Canadian dollar are relatively high. Figure 1 shows the dynamic conditional correlation 
between each of the eight currencies with the U.S. dollar futures. Consistent with what has been 
estimated from the DCC model (namely the DCC beta parameter) the conditional correlation, 
noted as rho, between the Brazilian real and the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble and the U.S. 
dollar have a tendency to be near zero and often change signs. Also, similar to the results of 
Table 4, the Australian dollar, British pound, Canadian dollar, and Japanese yen are the most 
positively correlated with U.S. dollar futures. One can observe that these relationships vary 
dramatically over the sample period.  
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Figure 1. Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
Panel A. Correlation between Australian Dollar and American Dollar Futures 
 
 
 
Panel B. Correlation between British Pound and American Dollar Futures 
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Panel C. Correlation between Brazilian Real and American Dollar Futures 
 
 
 
Panel D. Correlation between Canadian Dollar and American Dollar Futures 
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Panel E. Correlation between Euro Currency and American Dollar Futures 
 
 
 
Panel F. Correlation between Japanese Yen and American Dollar Futures 
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Panel G. Correlation between Russia Ruble and American Dollar Futures 
 
 
 
Panel H. Correlation between Swiss Franc and American Dollar Futures 
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Table 4.  DCC Model Results for Eight Currency Futures 
Futures Contract DCC α Parameter DCC β Parameter Correlation (Return) Correlation (Volatility) Log likelihood 
Australian Dollar 0.0153*** (0.0026) 0.9832*** (0.0031) -0.4766 -0.4710 -6279 
British Pound 0.0331*** (0.0020) 0.9581*** (0.0029) -0.7051 -0.7011 -5806 
Brazilian Real 0.0069*** (0.0021) -0.9079*** (0.2041) 0.0039 -0.0488 -6648 
Canadian Dollar 0.0138*** (0.0031) 0.9837*** (0.0039) -0.3767 -0.3641 -6433 
Euro Currency 0.0728*** (0.0024) 0.6073*** (0.0079) -0.9351 -0.9372 -4083 
Japanese Yen 0.0253*** (0.0033) 0.9715*** (0.0041) -0.4559 -0.4613 -6299 
Russian Ruble 0.0304*** (0.0005) -0.5178*** (0.0032) 0.0983 0.1043 -6638 
Swiss Franc 0.0982*** (0.0073) 0.3075*** (0.0626) -0.8860 -0.8834 -4791 
 
B. The Role of Liquidity 
      Table 3, as previously stated, shows that liquidity varies across different currency futures. 
Table 5 provides further evidence using the correlation matrix coefficients regarding return, the 
time-varying correlation of currency futures and U.S. dollar index futures, and liquidity measures. 
For all the currency futures, the Amihud illiquidity measure is negatively correlated with the 
logarithm of trading volume. 
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 Table 5.  Correlation Matrix of Correlation and Liquidity Measures 
 
 
Return 
Australian 
Dollar 
Correlation 
Australian 
Dollar 
Amihud 
Australian 
Dollar 
Log(Volume) 
Australian 
Dollar   
Return 
British 
Pound 
Correlation 
British 
Pound 
Amihud 
British 
Pound 
Log(Volume) 
British Pound 
Return 
Australian 
Dollar 
1 0.00039 0.07506 -0.02918 
 
Return 
British Pound 1 -0.01089 0.05073 -0.03872 
Correlation 
Australian 
Dollar  
1 0.08876 -0.18482 
 
Correlation 
British Pound  1 -0.17448 0.17887 
Amihud 
Australian 
Dollar   
1 -0.48034 
 
Amihud      
British Pound   1 -0.43617 
Log(Volume) 
Australian 
Dollar    
1 
 
Log(Volume) 
British Pound    1 
 
Return 
Brazalia 
Ruble 
Correlation 
Brazalia 
Ruble 
Amihud 
Brazalia 
Ruble 
Log(Volume) 
Brazalia 
Ruble   
Return 
Canadian 
Dollar 
Correlation 
Canadian 
Dollar 
Amihud 
Canadian 
Dollar 
Log(Volume) 
Canadian 
Dollar 
Return 
Brazalia 
Ruble 
1 -0.02807 0.06981 -0.0321 
 
Return 
Canadian 
Dollar 
1 -0.01613 0.06774 -0.01738 
Correlation 
Brazalia 
Ruble  
1 -0.02921 0.02352 
 
Correlation 
Canadian 
Dollar  
1 -0.31254 0.28138 
Amihud 
Brazalia 
Ruble   
1 -0.73588 
 
Amihud 
Canadian 
Dollar   
1 -0.44945 
Log(Volume) 
Brazalia 
Ruble    
1 
 
Log(Volume) 
Canadian 
Dollar    
1 
 
Return 
Euro 
Currency 
Correlation 
Euro 
Currency 
Amihud 
Euro 
Currency 
Log(Volume) 
Euro 
Currency   
Return 
Japanese 
Yen 
Correlation 
Japanese 
Yen 
Amihud 
Japanese 
Yen 
Log(Volume) 
Japanese Yen 
Return Euro 
Currency 1 0.00832 0.01982 0.00742  
Return 
Japanese Yen 1 -0.00362 -0.01726 0.00674 
Correlation 
Euro 
Currency  
1 0.00893 -0.00907 
 
Correlation 
Japanese Yen  1 -0.07844 0.15545 
Amihud Euro 
Currency   1 -0.35878  
Amihud 
Japanese Yen   1 -0.47326 
Log(Volume) 
Euro 
Currency    
1 
 
Log(Volume) 
Japanese Yen    1 
 
Return 
Russian 
Ruble 
Correlation 
Russian 
Ruble 
Amihud 
Russian 
Ruble 
Log(Volume) 
Russian 
Ruble   
Return 
Swiss 
Franc 
Correlation 
Swiss Franc 
Amihud 
Swiss 
Franc 
Log(Volume) 
Swiss Franc 
Return 
Russian 
Ruble 
1 0.02585 0.06023 -0.04614 
 
Return Swiss 
Franc 
1 0.01132 0.01745 -0.00377 
Correlation 
Russian 
Ruble  
1 -0.01413 0.02745 
 
Correlation 
Swiss Franc  1 0.0107 0.01341 
Amihud 
Russian 
Ruble   
1 -0.63667 
 
Amihud 
Swiss Franc   1 -0.49249 
Log(Volume) 
Russian 
Ruble    
1 
 
Log(Volume) 
Swiss Franc    1 
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    For five out of eight currency futures, the correlation coefficient between the conditional 
correlations and Amihud measure is negative, which implies that higher illiquidity promotes a 
declining correlation between currency futures and U.S. dollar index futures. The exceptions are 
the Australian dollar, Brazilian real, and Swiss franc futures. For these futures, higher illiquidity 
actually promotes a closer conditional correlation between them and U.S. dollar index futures. 
For six out of eight currency futures the correlation coefficient between the conditional 
correlations and logarithm of trading volume is positive, which implies that more active trading 
promotes a higher correlation between currency futures and U.S. dollar Index futures. The 
exceptions are again the Australian dollar and the Brazilian real futures. For these futures, more 
active trading is related with declaiming conditional correlation between them and U.S. dollar 
index futures.  
      From the above analysis, it can be seen that liquidity does impacts the conditional 
correlations. In order to examine this further, a regression approach is used to examine the extent 
to which variations in the conditional correlations of currency futures and U.S. dollar index 
futures are related to the different aspects of liquidity. More specifically, I run the following 
regression: 
1 2 ( )rho a b Amihud Illquidity b Log trading volume ε= + × + × +
 
Table 6 shows how currency futures liquidity impacts the varied correlations between 
currency futures and U.S. dollar futures. The dependent variable is the correlation (i.e. rho) is 
estimated from the DCC model, while the independent variables are the Amihud illiquidity 
measure as well as the logarithms of the trading volumes for each future. One very striking result 
from Table 6 is that when the currency futures and U.S. dollar futures share a negative 
relationship, the independent variables (Amihud illiquidity and trading volume) do not have 
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explanatory power in regards to the dynamic correlation. An example of this would include the 
results for the Brazilian real and the Russian ruble. However, the liquidity measure does have 
explanatory power for several positive correlations between currency futures and U.S. dollar, 
such as the results for the Australian dollar, British pound, and the Canadian dollar.  
Table 6.  The Varying Correlations and Currency Futures Liquidity 
Futures Contract a b1 b2 t-stat(a) t-stat(b1) t-stat(b2) R-Square  
Australian Dollar -0.3383 -20.7353 -0.0255 -9.42 -0.80 -5.65 0.30 
 
(0.0359) (25.7881) (0.0045) 
    
        
British Pound -0.7805 152.9319 0.0061 -38.02 4.57 2.47 0.1810000 
 
(0.0205) (33.4766) (0.0025) 
    
        
Brazilian Real -0.0494 0.0005 0.0001 -51.50 0.03 0.26 0.01 
 
(0.0010) (0.0181) (0.0002) 
    
        
Canadian Dollar -0.5807 272.1610 0.0191 -16.03 2.57 4.48 0.172 
 
(0.0362) (105.9979) (0.0191) 
    
        
Euro Currency -0.9182 311.7216 -0.0019 -43.08 1.13 -0.77 0.30 
 
(0.0213) (275.1507) (0.0024) 
    
        
Japanese Yen -0.4531 -54.3483 -0.0063 -12.18 -0.33 -1.51 0.21 
 
(0.0372) (166.2133) (0.0042) 
    
        
Russian Ruble 0.1110 -201.2677 -0.0008 11.84 -1.65 -0.71 0.24 
 
(0.0094) (121.6324) (0.0012) 
    
        
Swiss Franc -0.8919 2.5568 0.0011 -120.07 0.14 1.28 0.17 
  (0.0074) (17.7233) (0.0009)         
 
6.  Conclusion 
       This study investigates the dynamic correlation between currency futures prices, focusing 
on the persistency of correlation of currency prices. Using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
61 
 
model developed by Engle (2002), this study incorporates time-varying correlations into the 
analysis. The sample includes eight currency futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
from 1999 to 2008 and the U.S. dollar index futures. The study finds that the Canadian dollar has 
the greater persistency while the Brazilian real has the weakest. No less important, the study 
finds that the time-varying conditional correlation between currency futures and the U.S. dollar 
futures is influenced by two types of liquidity: price impacts (Amihud illiquidity) and the 
logarithm of trading volume. 
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Appendix 1: Background Information of Each Currency 
Australian Dollar 
Beginning in 1966 the Australian dollar became the official currency of Australia. At that 
time, the global currency market was managed under the Bretton Woods system. This system 
operated throughcountries pegging their currency to the U.S. dollar (USD) by means of a fixed 
exchange rate. When the Bretton Woods system finally collapsed it forced many countries to 
adopt a floating rate of currency, including the Australian dollar in 1971. The Australian dollar’s 
highest value relative to the USD was $0.881 in December of 1988. The lowest value was 
$0.4775 in April of 2001. The Australian dollar is heavily influenced by Australia’s business 
cycle, due to the fact that the Australian economy is so heavily reliant upon commodities. The 
Australian dollar’s exchange rate movement is often opposite the direction to reserve currencies, 
which tend to be stronger during downward turns of the business cycle. 
 
British Pound 
The British Pound has a long and distinguished history. In regards to its more recent 
history the pound officially adopted a floating rate in August of 1971 after the end of the Bretton 
Woods system. Later, in October of 1990 the British government joined the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM). However, Britain was forced to quit that system on “Black Wednesday” 
(September 16, 1992) due to the fact that Britain’s economic performance made the exchange 
rate unsustainable. As a member of the European Union, Britain retains the right to adopt the 
euro as the country’s currency; however, the politics involved with such a decision are very 
divisive. In April 2007 the pound hit a 15-year high against the USD with an exchange rate of $2 
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USD to one British Pound. Since the global financial crisis of 2008 the pound has since 
depreciated considerably. 
 
Brazilian Real 
The modern real was introduced in July of 1994 where it was set equal to 1 USD. The 
new currency replaced the short-lived cruzeiro real (CR$). After its introduction, the real 
unexpectedly gained value against the USD. During the 1994-1995 periods it attained its 
maximum dollar value of $1.20. However, between 1996 and 1998 the Central Bank allowed the 
real to depreciate in a slow and smooth manner, so that by the end of 1998 the exchange rate had 
dropped from a 1:1 ratio to about a 1.2:1ratio. The currency's value continued a mostly 
downwards path for the next four years. By October 2002 the exchange rate had reached an 
historic low of almost 4 reals per 1 USD. In May 2007the real finally began to appreciate and 
became valued at more than $0.50 - even though the Central Bank was still trying to keep the 
exchange rate low. The Central Bank feared the effect that a rising exchange rate might have on 
the Brazilian economy due to its reliance on exports. 
 
Canadian Dollar 
Unlike most currencies in the Bretton Woods system the Canadian dollar actually had a 
floating exchange rate. This floating rate lasted from 1950 to 1962. In 1962 Canada decided to 
switch to a fixed exchange rate, which was set at $0.925. However, with the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system it was forced to switch back to a floating rate in 1970. It has maintained a 
floating exchange rate ever since. During the 1990’s the Canadian dollar fell in value against the 
USD, and was traded for as little as $0.6179 on January 21, 2002. In more recent years its value 
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has appreciated due to the demand for commodities which Canada exports. By September 28, 
2007, the Canadian dollar had actually closed above the USD for the first time in 30 years at a 
rate of $1.0052 to 1 Canadian dollar.  
 
Euro Currency 
The euro (€) is a currency currently used by 17 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. It is considered to be the second largest reserve currency 
in the world as well as the second most traded currency in the world. The euro was originally 
introduced as an accounting currency in January 1999. It was not until 2002 that actual paper 
money and coinage was issued. Since 2002 the euro has traded above the USD with a high of 
US$1.6038 on July 2008. While the euro has many strengths, a relative weakness has been the 
low interest rates tied to the currency. These low interest rates allowed governments that use the 
euro to borrow to excess, eventually causing public deficits to grow uncontrollable. Europe is 
still dealing with its public debt issues. 
 
Japanese Yen 
After World War II, Japan needed help in stabilizing its economy. To that end Japan 
joined the Bretton Wood System in 1949, whereupon it set the value of the yen at a fixed rate of 
¥360 per 1 USD. This exchange rate remained in place until 1971, when the United States 
abandoned the gold standard (thus triggering the end of the Bretton Woods System).Although the 
yen has had a floating exchange rate since the early 1970’s, the Japanese government has 
continuously interfered in the forex market by buying and selling USD in order to manipulate the 
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country’s exchange rate. In the 1990’s the yen declined significantly against the dollar due to the 
bursting of the Japanese asset price bubble, reaching a low of ¥134 to $1 in February of 2002. In 
order to fight the downward pressure placed on the Japanese economy (from the bursting of the 
bubble) the Bank of Japan adopted a zero interest rate policy. This has caused the yen to become 
a major player in the carry trade market, since investors can borrow cheaply in yen and invest in 
other currencies with higher interest rates. The yen continued its decline from the 1990’s all the 
way until 2007when the bursting of another bubble, the U.S. housing market bubble, finally 
caused the yen to appreciate. 
 
Russian Ruble 
Russia, over the years, has had many different rubles. The seventh version of the ruble 
was issued on January of 1998, with one new ruble equaling 1,000 old rubles. This seventh ruble 
was issued for purely psychological reasons. Regardless, the ruble was forced to depreciate 
significantly in August 1998 due to the Russian Financial Crisis. During this period the ruble lost 
almost 70% of its value against the USD. Since that time, the ruble has been doing better, 
although inflation in Russian still undermines much of the value of the currency.  
 
Swiss Franc 
In 1945, Switzerland joined the Bretton Woods system and pegged the Swiss franc to the 
USD at a rate of $1 = 4.30521 francs. Historically, the Swiss franc has been considered a safe 
currency especially because (since the 1920’s) the Swiss franc was linked to gold. However, a 
referendum held in May 2000 delinked the Swiss franc from its gold peg. Nevertheless, this 
currency is still prized due to its extremely low inflation rates. 
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Appendix 2: USDX Futures Contract Specifications 
U.S. Dollar Index (USDX) Futures Specifications (as of June 30, 2002): 
Contract size: $1000 times the USDX index. 
Trading hours: 3:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and 8:05 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
Contract months: March, June, September, December 
Ticker symbol: DX 
Price quotation: The U.S. dollar index is quoted as a percent of its value as of March 1973, 
calculated to two decimal places (e.g., on July 31, 2002, the USDX index officially closed at 
107.41) 
Minimum price fluctuation: The minimum price fluctuation, or “tick size” for the USDX index 
is 0.01 USDX point, which is equivalent to $10.00 per futures contract. 
Limit on daily price move: 200 ticks above & below prior day's settlement, except during last 
30 minutes of any trading session when no limit applies. Should the price reach the limit and 
remain within 100 ticks of the limit for 15 minutes, then new limits will be established 200 ticks 
above and below the previous price limit 
Position limits: None 
Last day of trading: 2nd business day prior to the 3rd Wednesday of the expiring month. On the 
last trading day, trading ceases at 10:16 a.m. 
Settlement procedure: Contracts held to expiration are settled in cash, based on the value of the 
USDX index at 10am (New York time) on the last day of trading for an expiring contract. The 
USDX settlement value is computed by Reuters LTD, in accordance to New York Cotton 
Exchange regulations. 
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